Addressing Idaho Minors: Advocating for the Right to Seek Legal Out-of-State Abortions Under the First Amendment

The recent Ninth Circuit ruling in Matsumoto v. Labrador, written by Judge Margaret McKeown and joined by Judge John Owens, addressed the constitutionality of Idaho’s statute Section 18-623, which limits the ability to assist minors in obtaining abortions outside of parental knowledge. The court concluded that Section 18-623 does not violate constitutional vagueness standards, despite its convoluted language. The court differentiated between clearly prohibited conducts—like providing transportation or shelter for minors seeking abortion services—and those that are not, such as soliciting donations to support such minors. The law’s language regarding "recruiting" is deemed broad but understandable, meeting minimal clarity standards, thereby not falling into vagueness that would make it unconstitutional per se.

However, the court recognized an important distinction under the First Amendment concerning rights of association and free speech. The court found that Section 18-623 does not inhibit the ability of individuals or organizations to collectively support or provide information with respect to abortion rights, nor does it compel organizations to disclose donor identities or membership. As a result, claims of infringement upon the right of association provided no grounding for rejecting the statute. Still, the nuanced relationship between different conduct categories—specifically "harboring," "transporting," and "recruiting”—merits careful analysis, especially considering their implications for First Amendment protections.

A critical aspect of the court’s analysis involved how "harboring" and "transporting" were interpreted within the statute’s context. The definitions of these terms are straightforward—harboring means providing shelter, while transporting refers to movement from one place to another. The judges asserted that these actions, even if they carry some expressive components, primarily involve non-expressive conduct. The real intersection with First Amendment protections occurs with "recruiting," which brings considerable breadth into question. The court acknowledged that "recruiting," defined as persuading someone to undertake a specific action, could easily encompass protected forms of speech, especially when it involves sharing information about abortion.

Idaho’s attempts to constrict the interpretation of "recruiting" by stating that providing information is not prohibited proved insufficient. The court noted that such information—including counseling on how to procure an abortion—could still fall under the statute’s definition of recruiting. The authoring organizations expressed they intended to provide various kinds of support to pregnant minors, including emotional and informational assistance, all of which could be interpreted as recruiting under the sweeping definitions in Section 18-623. Furthermore, the statute’s nuances leave many activities open to criminal liability, especially those that financially support or assist with the logistical hurdles of accessing abortion services.

As the ruling progressed, the court highlighted concerns regarding a situation where adults providing necessary assistance, including funding or logistical arrangements for out-of-state abortion access, could unintentionally breach Section 18-623. Even speech encouraging minors to learn about abortion options could result in potential prosecution. The ruling illustrated scenarios—such as a driver offering funds or guidance—convincingly demonstrating how broadly the statute could be prosecuted. The ramifications affect not just recruiting to procure abortions but extend to broader encouragement that may unintentionally implicate adults seeking to assist minors.

In conclusion, Judge McKeown’s opinion ultimately articulated that Section 18-623’s "recruiting" provision infringed on protected speech under the First Amendment. Encouragement, counseling, and advocacy surrounding reproductive health options, including legal abortion, are protected rights, independent of whether conveyed to adults or minors. The statute’s reach is inconsistent with established First Amendment jurisprudence and runs afoul of legal principles regarding clients’ rights. By emphasizing the comprehensive overlap between the statutory language and expressive conduct, the court deemed Idaho’s law unconstitutional for its overbreadth and potential chilling effect on free speech and association. This case, crucially navigating the intersection of abortion rights and constitutional freedoms, sets a significant precedent for future challenges against similar state statutes.