DePaul Professor Censured by Faculty Council After Writing Controversial Anti-Palestinian Article Loses Contract and Defamation and Discrimination Suit

The Illinois Appellate Court recently ruled on the case of Hill v. DePaul University, involving Jason Hill, a tenured professor of philosophy at DePaul, who published an op-ed in The Federalist in 2019 supporting Israel’s annexation of the West Bank. Hill’s article, which argued for Israel’s moral right to annex the territories and criticized Palestinian governance and culture, was met with backlash from within the university. In response, the Faculty Council drafted a resolution that criticized Hill’s statements while affirming his right to academic freedom. The resolution condemned the article for misrepresenting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, advocating war crimes, and promoting racism towards Palestinians. Although the resolution recognized Hill’s academic freedom, it urged him to reconsider his views and acknowledge the harm his words may have caused.

Not long after the resolution’s passage, Provost Ghanem issued a message expressing disapproval of Hill’s use of his academic freedom and the feelings of unwelcoming among community members in light of his article. Hill subsequently filed a lawsuit against DePaul University, claiming both breach of contract regarding the Faculty Handbook and defamation stemming from the Faculty Council’s resolution. He argued that the statements made in the resolution were defamatory and damaging to his reputation. However, the court ultimately found that the statements in the Faculty Council’s resolution were nonactionable expressions of opinion, which are protected under the First Amendment, emphasizing that criticism of academic work should be expected in academic discourse and does not warrant judicial interference.

The court also rejected Hill’s defamation claims, asserting that the resolution’s criticisms reflected evaluative opinions based on publicly disclosed facts—the content of Hill’s article. Since the resolution aimed to criticize an academic’s viewpoints on a controversial subject, it fell within the normative scope of academic discussion, a domain traditionally eschewed from legal scrutiny. The court pointed out that academic evaluations do not constitute grounds for defamation, as they are subjective assessments of scholarly work rather than accusations of factual wrongdoing. By framing the resolution as an academic opinion rather than a personal attack, judicial intervention was deemed unnecessary.

Furthermore, Hill alleged that he faced discrimination due to his race and sexual orientation, suggesting that similar actions were not taken against other faculty members who made controversial statements on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Despite these claims, the court highlighted that, under federal anti-discrimination laws, to qualify as an adverse employment action, the action must display tangible effects on an employee’s status or benefits. Hill failed to demonstrate that he experienced any material changes in employment due to the resolution, as he remained a tenured faculty member without any salary reduction or demotion.

Although Hill tried to argue that the Faculty Council’s approval of the resolution constituted an adverse employment action, the court found that it did not suffice as such because he retained his position and did not incur any direct financial loss. The court noted that his speculation of diminished future promotion prospects and pay increases did not meet the threshold for material harm necessary to establish discrimination claims. In summation, the court found that the Faculty Council’s resolution was simply an expression of professional disapproval and discourse, and did not adversely affect Hill’s employment status, thus leading to the dismissal of his claims against DePaul.

Ultimately, the Hill v. DePaul University case reflects the complexities surrounding academic freedom, speech, and the boundaries of acceptable discourse within university settings. It poses critical questions regarding how institutions respond to controversial statements made by their faculty, the nature and protection of academic expressions, and the judicial system’s role in moderating disputes stemming from academic evaluations. The case serves as a significant example for future discussions on the legal limits of free expression in academia, reinforcing the notion that while faculty members have rights protected by academic freedom, such rights are counterbalanced by institutional values and the core responsibilities of educators regarding the impact of their statements on the broader community.