Disband the Military

The formation of the United States Army was initially conceived with a clear caution against permanence, reflecting widespread apprehensions among the Founding Fathers. George Washington, the first commander of the Continental Army, articulated a fundamental principle: a “large standing Army in time of Peace” poses a danger to the liberties of a nation. This sentiment resonated with other key figures in the founding of America. Alexander Hamilton expressed fears that a “standing military force, with an overgrown Executive” would compromise freedom, while James Madison highlighted that defenses against external threats could often become instruments of domestic tyranny. Elbridge Gerry underscored the importance of militias in preventing the establishment of a standing army, viewed as detrimental to liberty. These apprehensions crystallized in the Constitution, specifically in Article 1, Section 8, which permits Congress to raise armies but limits funding to two-year terms. Conversely, there are no such limitations on naval spending, implying an intention for a peacetime naval defense while minimizing overreliance on land armies.

Yet, in stark contrast to the Founding Fathers’ vision, the U.S. Army has grown into a vast institution over the past century, boasting nearly half a million active duty personnel and a substantial reserve force. Pre-World War I, the U.S. Army lacked permanent division-level units, indicating a lean and minimalist military approach. However, the subsequent evolution into a significant standing force has led to the recruitment of National Guard units under federal control, which are often deployed abroad rather than merely serving local communities. The historical context shows that the fears of military coup d’état have not come to fruition in the U.S., yet the implications of having a standing army manifest in different forms. The consequences are not merely financial; the existence of a large, permanent military has facilitated presidential initiatives to engage in overseas conflicts absent of formal declarations of war or substantial public discourse. Moreover, the military’s influence extends into domestic law enforcement, raising concerns about civil liberties and governmental power.

The statistics regarding U.S. military interventions reflect this drastic shift in military engagement philosophies. From 1776 through 1945, the average number of foreign interventions stood at one per year, according to Monica Duffy Toft and Sidita Kushi in their work “Dying by the Sword: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy.” However, this has escalated to an average of 4.6 interventions annually post-1945. This transition highlights a departure from diplomatic efforts or economic coercion toward a militaristic strategy that favors direct conflict. Tactically, this means that military force is too frequently the chosen method to resolve international disputes, diluting the original intent of using it solely as a last resort. The proliferation of military tactics has also seeped into domestic policy, wherein the Army’s frameworks for counterinsurgency have been employed in training law enforcement. The inception of training facilities designed for such purposes during civil unrest in the 1960s exemplifies this concerning trend.

In the aftermath of events like 9/11, a notable militarization of local police departments ensued, fueled by programs allowing surplus military equipment to flow into civilian hands. With over $1.6 billion allocated for this purpose, as reported by the Brown University Costs of War Project, the results have sparked critical debate over the implications of militarized domestic policing. These developments usher in serious considerations about the value of maintaining a substantial standing army in contemporary contexts, especially when evaluated against the relatively subdued threats to U.S. territorial integrity following historical tensions with neighboring countries. The landscape of international relations and alliances has shifted, with countries like Canada and Mexico now categorized as friendly and cooperative partners.

The security challenges faced by the U.S. currently tilt more toward strategic allies and global trade interests rather than direct territorial threats. Chief among these contemporary challenges is the rise of China, which suggests that conflicts may likely play out in the Pacific rather than necessitating ground forces. A posture that relies heavily on air and naval power appears vital for modern strategic defense. A 2020 study by the Cato Institute supports the need for a reevaluation of military priorities, advocating for a leaner Army focused on hemispheric defense, thereby reorienting U.S. military resources more towards the Navy and Air Force. This perspective not only aligns with a more restrained military doctrine but also echoes the foundational vision of American military structure promoted by the Founding Fathers.

In conclusion, the United States Army has evolved into a vast and intricate system far removed from the founders’ original intent to avoid a standing army. While historical fears of tyranny have, in some respects, been alleviated, the implications of a large military apparatus continue to challenge civil liberties and international engagement principles. The trend towards frequent military interventions and the militarization of domestic law enforcement raise pivotal questions about accountability and the proper role of armed forces in society. With fewer threats to homeland security, and increasing complexities in international relations, a reassessment of military strategy and structure is compelling. Reimagining a defense posture similarly grounded in the ideas of a militia and naval reliance may better reflect current realities and yield a more restrained approach to America’s military commitments.