Reference to Defendant’s Dislike of ‘Judeo-Christian Values as Beneficial for Civilization’ in Sentencing Does Not Breach the First Amendment

In the recent ruling from the Second Circuit Court in the case of U.S. v. Melzer, defendant Ethan Phelan Melzer challenged the district court’s judgment after pleading guilty to charges that included attempting to murder U.S. service members, providing material support to terrorists, and illegally transmitting national defense information. The district court imposed a significant sentence of 540 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Melzer’s primary argument on appeal focused on claims of procedural sentencing error, stemming from comments made by the district court regarding his ideology, specifically his expressed aversion to “Judeo-Christian values.” Melzer contended that these remarks suggested an improper consideration during sentencing that influenced the length of his punishment.

Ethan Melzer’s case arose from his actions while enlisted in the U.S. Army and stationed in Italy. After finishing his basic training, Melzer became involved with a violent extremist organization known as the Order of the Nine Angels (O9A), infamous for its neo-Nazi, white supremacist, and jihadist ideology. Melzer began plotting to attack his fellow soldiers in a jihadist operation, seeking to coordinate efforts through a Telegram group chat with other members of O9A. After sharing sensitive, classified information regarding his platoon’s deployment plans, military authorities apprehended Melzer just as his unit was preparing to leave for deployment, uncovering further messages of intent to carry out the planned attack.

During the sentencing process, the district court articulated its rationale for imposing such a severe sentence by labeling Melzer’s crimes as not only a betrayal of the military but also an intention to incite chaos and violence against fellow soldiers, evident from his allegiance to O9A’s ideologies. The court indicated that Melzer aimed to degrade societal values they perceived as obstacles to establishing a “natural order” of chaos, thereby emphasizing the seriousness and reprehensibility of his actions. Importantly, the details of the O9A ideology, including its opposition to Judeo-Christian values, were drawn from a pre-sentencing report that Melzer did not contest, leading to his framing of these ideologies’ role within the context of his offense.

On appeal, the court applied a plain error standard of review, as Melzer failed to object to the sentencing comments at the time they were made. The appellate judges assessed whether the district court had improperly considered a constitutionally impermissible factor in sentencing. The judges determined that while typically, a court must avoid allowing personal beliefs or characteristics to unduly influence a defendant’s sentence, the comments made focused explicitly on Melzer’s criminal conduct rather than his ideologies. They concluded that references to his hostility towards Judeo-Christian values were relevant in understanding his motives for committing the crimes, thus fully aligned with considerations of future dangerousness and the gravity of his actions, and not indicative of improper sentencing bias.

The judges further argued that the First Amendment does not prevent a court from discussing the ideological underpinnings of a defendant’s actions if they are relevant to understanding motive or threat level. They maintained that the district court’s remarks did not reflect a value judgment on the part of the court about Judeo-Christian values but rather articulated the defendant’s perspective and its implications for his criminal intentions. The sentence’s formulation explicitly indicated that the court was addressing Malzer’s actions driven by his beliefs rather than sentencing him based on those beliefs themselves.

In their conclusion, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision, noting that Melzer’s actions had significant implications for both the safety of his fellow service members and the integrity of the military as a whole. They emphasized that Melzer’s sentencing was about his criminal acts—attempting to conspire against fellow soldiers—rather than merely his ideological affiliations. The ruling provided clarity on the boundaries of what constitutes permissible discussion during sentencing, underscoring the importance of treating ideology as a consideration only when directly relevant to the nature and motive behind a defendant’s illegal actions, thus upholding the original sentence imposed on Melzer without error.